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Abstract
We characterize the optimal prize allocation, namely the allocation that maximizes a 
group’s effectiveness, in a model of contests. The model has the following features: (i) it 
allows for heterogeneity between and within groups; (ii) it classifies contests as “easy” 
and “hard” depending on whether the marginal costs are concave or convex. Thus, we 
show that in an “easy” contest the optimal prize allocation assigns the entire prize to 
one group member, the most skilled one. Conversely, all group members receive a posi-
tive share of the prize when the contest is “hard” and players have unbounded above 
marginal productivities. If the contest is “hard” and the marginal productivities are 
bounded above, then only the most skilled group members are certain of receiving a 
positive share of the prize for any distribution of abilities. Finally, we study the effects 
of a change in the distribution of abilities within a group. Our analysis shows that if the 
contest is either “easy” or a particular subset of “hard”, then the more the heterogeneity 
within a group, the higher its probability of winning the prize.
1 Introduction
“Soldiers generally win battles; generals get credit for them.”1
Contests are ubiquitous in that they arise, for example, in wars, sports, elec-
toral campaigns and workplace competitions. When contests arise between groups, 
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respective members win or lose the prize collectively. However, individuals in a 
group may have different positions, skills, prize valuations, and various impacts 
over the outcome of the competition. When the prize has private characteristics, 
this within group heterogeneity can lead to personalized incentives, such as highly 
skilled players receiving a higher share of the prize over lower skilled ones. Con-
versely, an egalitarian allocation of prizes may be used to encourage cooperative 
behaviours among members. At the beginning of the Republic of Rome, for example, 
the tribunes equally distributed the spoils of war among all army members, includ-
ing those who only guarded the settlements and protected the wounded. After 407 
BC, the Roman Senate introduced different incentives according to the roles per-
formed by the members of the army: ordinary soldiers received a third of the wage 
of the knights and half of the wage of centurions. A similar rule was used under 
Napoleon’s Empire. Nowadays, victorious soldiers are awarded medals according to 
their rank in the army. Likewise, candidate prime ministers assign party members to 
different ministries. The assignment of the most influential people to the key min-
istries affects their efforts during the campaign and eventually the outcome of the 
elections. Finally, collective competitions are pervasive in the workplace, where, for 
example, department stores, retail chains, sales and production departments set up 
monetary rewards for the most productive teams. Nationally representative surveys 
reveal that 52% of firms use teamwork in the US, and 47% of British firms organized 
more than 90% of their workforce into teams; and 70% of Fortune 1000 companies 
use some form of team incentive (Bandiera et al. 2011).
In general, it seems evident that the way in which members are rewarded accord-
ing to their roles and responsibilities affects how much they contribute to the group 
goal. Thus, the purpose of this article is twofold: to propose an allocative rule that 
maximizes group effectiveness, hereafter the “optimal prize allocation”; and to 
study how a change in the distribution of abilities within a group affects its effective-
ness. We study our questions using a model with the following features: it allows for 
between and within groups heterogeneity; it classifies contests as “easy” and “hard” 
depending on whether the marginal costs are concave or convex; and each group has 
a manager that announces the optimal prize allocation only to her members.
Our analysis reveals the following results. In easy contests, the optimal prize allo-
cations assigns the entire prize to one group member, the most skilled one. On the 
other hand, in hard contests in which players’ marginal productivities are unbounded 
above, it rewards all group members . If the contest is hard and players’ marginal 
productivity are bounded above, then only the most skilled members of a group are 
certain of receiving a positive share of the prize for any distribution of abilities. Fur-
thermore, we find that a change in the distribution of abilities within a group affects 
the probability of winning of all competing groups. Specifically, if the contest is 
either easy or a specific subset of hard, then the more the heterogeneity within a 
group, the higher the group probability of winning. Finally, we rank the probability 
of winning of the competing groups from highest to lowest under two prize divi-
sions: the “egalitarian” allocation, i.e. the prize is equally shared among members of 
the same group; and the optimal prize allocation. Surprisingly, the ranking resulting 
from the egalitarian allocation can be fully reversed by implementing the optimal 
prize allocation.
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Much progress has been made in the study of contests since the seminal work 
of Tullock (1980).2 In regards to group contests for public good, related set-ups are 
analyzed by Baik (1993, 2008) and Ryvkin (2011). The former shows that if play-
ers have linear cost, then only the most skilled member in every group contributes 
to the group cause. The latter, however, shows that all group members are active 
participants if costs are strictly convex. Moreover, Ryvkin (2011) studies how a con-
test organizer has to sort (heterogeneous) players in same size groups to maximize 
the aggregate effort exerted in the competition. His results are that if the players’ 
cost function is moderately (sufficiently) steep, then a more (less) balanced com-
petition increases aggregate effort. Thus, one could wrongly assume that the same 
result extends to the optimal prize allocation because both papers relate to the steep-
ness of the cost function. However, this is not the case since the two definitions of 
steepness differ substantially.3 In addition, we do not focus on maximizing aggre-
gate effort, for example by allowing groups to compete for different prizes, rather on 
how a group manager strategically chooses to split the prize among her members. 
In regards to group contests for private good, the literature has considered the fol-
lowing ways of prize division among the winning group members: the “egalitarian” 
rule, used among others, by Esteban and Ray (2001) and Cheikbossian (2012) to 
study the group size paradox; the “relative effort” rule, which works as an incentive 
device, analysed by Nitzan (1991a); and any linear combination between the “egali-
tarian” and the “relative effort” rule studied by Nitzan (1991b) and Nitzan and Ueda 
(2011, 2018), meaning part of the prize is divided equally (egalitarian rule) and the 
rest proportionally according to each member’s effort (relative effort rule). Since the 
use of a relative effort allocation puts members of the same group in competition for 
the internal division of the prize, its full implementation eliminates the free-riding 
problem. However, its use effectively assumes that relative efforts can be costlessly 
observed and rewarded. Alternatively, a model with costs of monitoring needs to 
be introduced as in Ueda (2002). Even though this requirement seems innocuous, it 
reduces the applicability of this incentive device to few cases.4 Conversely, the egal-
itarian rule does not require that the individual contributions are observable, but it 
clearly tempts group members to free-ride on other’s contributions because they win 
or lose the prize as a group, i.e. winning the share of the prize is a “collective good”. 
To the best of our knowledge, the few works that study allocative schemes and do 
not require monitoring, assume symmetry among players and focus on the effects 
of within group inequality. Nitzan and Ueda (2014) focus on the effects of intra-
group heterogeneity in prize shares. The authors find that in easy (hard) contests the 
greater (lesser) the inequality in prize share, the higher the group efficiency. Cubel 
and Sanchez-Pages (2014) demonstrate through Atkinson’s index of inequality that 
egalitarian groups have a higher probability of winning the contest when the efforts 
2 For a review see Corchón (2007).
3 For instance, all (convex) power functions are “moderately” steep in Ryvkin’s model. On the other 
hand, we define a contest as easy or hard depending on whether the marginal costs are concave or con-
vex.
4 See Bandiera et al. (2011) for an example about fruit picking.
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of the group members are complementary, or the contest is hard. There are two main 
differences between these models and our own: first, while they study exogenous 
variations in prize allocations, we analyse the endogenous choices of the optimal 
one; second, in our model players can be heterogeneous in their ability. If players are 
symmetric, group members choose the same amount of contribution in equilibrium. 
On the other hand, if they are heterogeneous, they react to the same incentive differ-
ently. As a matter of fact, in our model different levels of within group heterogeneity 
affects both the distribution of the prize among group members and the probability 
of winning of all groups.
Section  2 contains the preliminaries of the model; Sect.  3 presents our model 
of contests with managers and discusses the effect of within group heterogeneity; 
Sect. 4 concludes.
2  Model preliminaries
We first analyse a model of complete information and exogenous prize allocations so 
as to state an equilibrium existence result useful for Sect. 3, where we will introduce 
incomplete information and endogenous prize allocations. This approach is conven-
ient both to introduce the preliminaries of our game with managers and to com-
pare efforts under the implementation of the egalitarian rule and the optimal one. 
Thus, we consider a game with N groups. The i-th group is formed by ni risk-neutral 
individuals making a total of ∑N
i
ni players. Players within-groups are indexed by 
ik = (i1, ....ini) . All players simultaneously and irreversibly exert an effort xik ≥ 0 . 
The group effort is the linear sum of its members’ effort, Xi =
∑ni
k=1
xik . The group 
probability of winning is defined by the Tullock success function 휎i = Xi∕X , where 
X =
∑N
i=1
Xi . Exerting effort is costly, but individuals are (possibly) heterogeneous 
in their abilities, vik ∈ (0,∞) . The cost of effort is given by v−1ik g(xik) , and thus it is 
costlier for low ability individuals to exert effort.5 We impose the following assump-
tion on g(x):
Assumption 1 (i) g(0) = 0 ; (ii) g�(0) = 0 ; (iii) g�(x) > 0 for all x > 0 ; iv) 
g��(x) > 0 for all x > 0 ; v) g���(x) exists for all x > 0.
Part (i) states that players do not bear costs when they do not exert any effort. 
Part (ii) states that the marginal cost of effort at x = 0 is zero. Part (iii) and (iv) 
state respectively that the effort cost function is strictly increasing and strictly con-
vex, which ensures the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in which all play-
ers exert a positive effort, as long as they receive a strictly positive prize. Finally, 
part (v) is necessary for comparative statics. Moreover, since g′ is monotonic and 
continuous, it has a well-defined inverse function, f = (g�)−1 . Assumption 1 is held 
throughout the paper.
In our setting, the winning group is rewarded with a private good prize normal-
ized to one, and the losing groups receive zero. For the moment, we also assume that 
5 This approach to define heterogeneity is commonly used in the literature of contests, see for example 
Ryvkin (2011, 2013), Brookins et al. (2015) and Nitzan and Ueda (2018).
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the winning ik member receives a share of the prize 휙ik according to an exogenous 
prize allocation 휙i = (휙i1,… ,휙ini ) s.t. 
∑ni
k=1
휙ik = 1 . In light of this, the player ik’s 
expected payoff is
Each player ik’s best response to all other players’ choice of effort is given by the 
first-order condition associated with the maximization of 휋ik as a function of xik , 
subject to xik ≥ 0 . Since (1) is strictly concave with respect to xik , the first-order con-
dition is necessary and sufficient for the best response. It follows that the player ik’s 
best response is
As discussed in the introduction, a contest for public good and linear costs, 
g(xik) = xik , is considered in Baik (2008). The result is that in each group only the 
player with the lowest marginal cost exerts a positive effort.6 On the other hand, 
under Assumption 1, it is possible to show that there is a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium in which all players that receive a positive share of the prize are active partici-
pants in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption  1, the contest between groups has a unique Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies for any prize allocation. In equilibrium, at least one 
player in each group exerts a positive effort, therefore all groups exert a positive 
effort. The equilibrium effort x∗
ik
 satisfies the system of Eq.  (2) with equality, and 
defines the group i’s effort as
Finally, we define contests in the following two ways: we refer to a contest as 
“easy” when the cost of exerting an additional amount of effort does not rapidly 
increase; conversely, a contest is “hard” when an additional amount of effort leads to 
a significant increase in the marginal cost.7 Formally,
Definition 1 A contest is “easy” when g′ is strictly concave (f convex). Conversely, a 
contest is “hard” when g′ is strictly convex (f concave).
(1)휋ik =
Xi
X
휙ik −
g(xik)
vik
.
(2)
Xj≠i
X2
휙ikvik = g
�(xik).
(3)X∗i (휙i) =
ni∑
k=1
x∗
ik
=
ni∑
k=1
f
(
X∗
j
(휙j)
(X∗)2
휙ikvik
)
.
6 A model with linear costs can be considered as a special case of the easy contests presented in this 
paper. As a result of the stark free-riding, it would be optimal to allocate the entire prize to the player 
with the lowest marginal cost.
7 The form of the marginal cost, g′ , depends on its third derivative. There are contests that are neither 
“easy” nor “hard”, for example when g���(x) > 0 for some x, and g���(x) < 0 for others. However, we focus 
our analysis only on these two cases.
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3  A model of group contests with managers
Hereafter, we move away from the model with complete information and exoge-
nous predetermined prize allocations. Instead, we now assume that every group has 
a manager that sets a prize allocation 휙i = (휙i1,… ,휙ini ) s.t. 
∑ni
k=1
휙ik = 1 in order 
to maximize her group’s probability of winning.8 This is a common situation since 
the compensation of managers is usually aligned with the results of their group. In 
addition, for a matter of realism, we assume that the prize allocation implemented 
by each manager is unobservable by those belonging to other groups. However, all 
players’ abilities remain common knowledge.
3.1  Information Structure
The timing and the information structure are adapted from Nitzan and Ueda (2011, 
2018) and described as follows: (i) each manager announces the prize allocation 
휙i = (휙i1,… ,휙ini ) to her members and (ii) group members enter in the contest with-
out knowing the prize allocations implemented in the other groups, and determine 
their contributions simultaneously and noncooperatively. Before choosing his con-
tribution, group member ik only knows his own group prize allocation, and finds 
himself in the information set containing the nodes at which the other groups have 
chosen a prize allocation 휙j≠i = (휙j1,… ,휙jnj ) . Thus, member ik’s strategy is 
described as a function of 휙i , and denoted by xik(휙i).
3.2  Beliefs
We consider the perfect Bayesian equilibrium as a solution of our model assuming 
that players can use only pure strategies. Since the choice of the prize allocation 
휙i = (휙i1,… ,휙ini ) is simultaneously made at the beginning of the game by the man-
agers, then group members’ beliefs are trivial. The belief of player ik, denoted by 
휇ik(휙i) , is a probability distribution defined over the space of possible allocations 
implemented in other groups. Suppose that (휙∗
1
,… ,휙∗
N
) is an equilibrium prize allo-
cation. At the information set lying on the equilibrium path the requirement of con-
sistency implies that player’s ik belief satisfies 휇ik(휙∗j≠i|휙∗i ) = 1 . Finally, we restrict 
the beliefs of group members off the path appealing to the “no-signalling-what-you-
don’t-know” condition.9 Thus, any deviation by a manager does not change the 
beliefs of her group members about the allocations implemented in other groups, i.e. 
휇ik(휙
∗
j≠i|휙i) = 1 ∀휙i . Altogether, we can use Eq.  (2) to characterize player ik and 
group i’s best responses. Since members are aware of the prize allocation 
휙i = (휙i1,… ,휙ini ) implemented by their own manager, i.e. at the information set 
indexed by 휙i , then the best responses are
9 Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
8 We could relax the equality constraint to ∑ni
k=1
휙ik ≤ 1 , but it would not change our results since we 
focus on the case in which managers aim to maximize their group’s effort .
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As previously established, players ik’s expected payoff is strictly concave in xik . It 
follows that the first-order conditions given by Eq. (4) are necessary and sufficient 
for the best responses.
3.3  Efficient managers
Managers’ behaviours vary accordingly to their objectives. We consider the case 
in which they want to maximize their group’s effort through the prize allocation 
휙i = (휙i1...,휙ini) . Before moving forward, it is important to note that the members 
of a group hold identical beliefs about the prize allocations implemented in other 
groups. Thus, if a manager maximizes her own group effort Xi(휙i) , then she also 
maximizes her group probability of winning since 휎i = Xi(휙i)∕(Xi(휙i) + X∗j (휙∗j )) . 
This observation allows us to see that the maximization of the group effort Xi(휙i) 
and the maximization of the group probability of winning 휎i are two equivalent 
problems. Overall, the manager of group i has to solve
where X∗
i
(휙i) is defined by Eq. (4). Hence, if we find a profile of prize allocations 
( 휙∗
i
,… ,휙∗
N
 ) that solves (5) for all i, and all players maximize their expected payoff 
under their information set, i.e. Eq. (4) holds with equality for all i, then we can state 
that it is a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the model with managers. 
As established by the following propositions, the number of equilibria depends on 
the type of contest and group members’ ability.
Proposition 3.1 Given Assumption 1, the easy contest between groups with manag-
ers has 
∏N
i
nh
i
 perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies, where nh
i
 is the number 
of group members with the highest ability in group i. Moreover, 
i) every 휙∗
i
 rewards the entire prize to one of the nh
i
 group members;
ii) all equilibria provide the same X∗
i
 , 휎∗
i
 , and X∗ ∀i.
Since an equilibrium is a profile of prize allocations ( 휙∗
i
,… ,휙∗
N
 ) that solves 
the systems of Eqs.  (4) and (5), and 휙∗
i
 rewards the entire prize to one among the 
most able group members, then all the optimal allocations provide the same X∗
i
 
for all i. However, at different equilibrium allocations different members contrib-
ute to the group effort. On the other hand, a unique equilibrium with one optimal 
prize allocation exists if the contest is hard.
(4)X∗i (휙i) =
ni∑
k=1
x∗
ik
(휙i) =
ni∑
k=1
f
(
X∗
j≠i(휙
∗
j
)
X2
휙ikvik
)
.
(5)휙∗i ∈ argmax X∗i (휙i) s.t.
ni∑
k=1
휙ik = 1, 휙ik ≥ 0 ∀k,
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Proposition 3.2 Given Assumption 1, the hard contest between groups with manag-
ers has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, 
i) symmetric players are rewarded equally, vik = vim implies 휙∗ik = 휙∗im;
ii) if marginal productivity is unbounded, then all members receive a positive share 
of the prize, g��(0) = 0 implies 𝜙∗
ik
> 0 ∀k;
iii) if marginal productivity is bounded above, then only the highest ability members 
receive a positive share of the prize for any equilibrium effort, g��(0) > 0 implies 
𝜙∗
ik
> 0 ∀X∗ iff vik = max[v].
In hard contests, a prize allocation is optimal when all the members of a group 
have the same marginal productivity, i.e. if vik
g��(x∗
ik
)
=
vim
g��(x∗
im
)
 where m ≠ k.10 Thus, 
group members with the same ability receive the same share of the prize 휙∗
ik
 . Fur-
thermore, if g��(0) = 0 , then all players always receive a positive share of the prize 
since their marginal productivity at zero effort equals infinity. Conversely, if 
g��(0) > 0 , then the players’ marginal productivity are bounded above. As a result, 
only the highest ability members of every group are certain of receiving a positive 
share of the prize. For example, we may have that vi1
g��(X∗
i
)
≥ vim
g��(0)
 , i.e. player i1 
receives the entire prize because we do not allow for negative prizes. We can relate 
our results to Cornes and Hartley (2005). In general terms, the authors define a play-
er’s dropout point as the equilibrium effort X∗ that makes him a non-active partici-
pant. If g�(0) = 0 , then there is no dropout point and all players exert positive effort. 
As a matter of facts, in our setting, all groups are always active, but member im 
drops out if vim < vi1 in easy contests, and if vim∕g��(0) ≤ vi1∕g��(x∗i1) ∀m > 1 in hard 
ones. However, group members do not drop out from the competition voluntarily, 
but they optimally respond to the allocation implemented by their manager. Part (iii) 
of the proposition can be related to the group size effect in contests. Specifically, the 
literature shows that, in hard contests in which groups are formed by symmetric 
members who equally share the prize, a group increases its effort increasing its 
size.11 In contrast, in our setting that introduces heterogeneity, an increase in size 
affects the group effort if and only if the new member receives a positive share of 
the prize from the optimal prize allocation. Finally, the two propositions above 
relates to inequality if we interpret the optimal allocation as the efficient (reverse) 
Pigou-Dalton transfer of the (possible) rewards.12 Thus, when the contest is easy 
and/or players are heterogeneous, then managers have always a preference for ine-
quality. Specifically, they would commit to transfer part of (or all) the possible gains 
from the less able workers to the most able ones even if the contest is hard.
11 See the “anti- Olson (1965) theorem” in Nitzan and Ueda (2014) and Proposition 2 in Esteban and 
Ray (2001).
12 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention.
10 Equivalently, for any two active members it holds g
� (x∗
i1
)
g�� (x∗
i1
)𝜙∗
i1
=
g� (x∗
im
)
g�� (x∗
im
)𝜙∗
im
∀m > 1.
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3.4  Within group heterogeneity and group effectiveness
In this section, we revise some results of the effects of within group heterogeneity in 
ability under the widely used egalitarian allocation,13 휙ik = 1∕ni ∀k , and then com-
pare them to the effects of heterogeneity under the optimal allocation, 휙i = 휙∗i ∀i . 
To consider this matter, we define heterogeneity within groups following the defini-
tion of inequality in the sense of Lorenz dominance. Thus, we ask when 
X�
i
(x�
ik
,… , x�
ini
) ≥ Xi(xi1,… , xini ) , where x
�
i1
,… , x�
ini
 are members equilibrium efforts 
under a “more spread out” distribution of abilities than xi1,… , xini . To go along with 
this analysis we define the notions associated with majorization introduced by Hardy 
et al. (1934) which is equivalent to the notion of inequality in the sense of Lorenz 
dominance as shown by Dasgupta et al. (1973).
Definition 2 Let 퐱′ and 퐱 be two vectors in Rn , ordered so that x′
1
≥ ... ≥ x′
n
 and 
x1 ≥ ... ≥ xn . If 
∑n
k=1
x�
k
=
∑n
k=1
xk and x�1 + ... + x�l ≥ x1 + ... + xl for all l ≤ n (with 
strict inequality for at least one l), then we say that 퐱′ majorizes 퐱 written as 퐱′ ≻ 퐱 . 
A permutation symmetric function F of n variables is Schur-convex if the inequality 
F(퐱�) ≥ F(퐱) holds whenever 퐱′ ≻ 퐱 . General discussion of majorization theory and 
Schur-convex functions can be found in Marshall et al. (1979).
Thus, we try to understand in which situations within group heterogeneity 
increases group effectiveness drawing on existing knowledge from non-strategic 
environments, but keeping in mind that we actually move towards different equi-
libria. Let us now assume that all managers implement the egalitarian allocation, 
휙i = 1∕ni ∀i . In this situation, the group i’s effort in equilibrium is
Fixing 휎∗
i
 and X∗ , the group i’s effort can be written as a function of the vector of 
abilities, X∗
i
= F(퐯퐢) . This observation together with Definition 2 helps us to state14
Lemma 2 Given a contest between groups in which the prize is equally shared 
among group members: 
i) if the contest is easy, then the higher the within group heterogeneity in ability, 
the higher the group effectiveness. Formally, a change from 퐯퐢 to 퐯′퐢 where 퐯′퐢 ≻ 퐯퐢 
implies 𝜎′
i
> 𝜎i , X′ > X and X′i > Xi.
(6)X∗i =
ni∑
k=1
f
(
1 − 휎∗
i
X∗
1
ni
vik
)
.
13 This is mathematically equivalent to a public good contest.
14 Lemma 2 can be derived from Proposition 2 in Nitzan and Ueda (2014) where they allow heterogene-
ity in 휙ik fixing vik.
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ii) if the contest is hard, then the lower the heterogeneity in ability, the higher the 
group effectiveness. Formally, a change from 퐯퐢 to 퐯′퐢 where 퐯′퐢 ≺ 퐯퐢 implies 𝜎′i > 𝜎i , 
X′ > X and X′
i
> Xi
The intuition of this result is easy to grasp: when the contest is easy, low ability 
players free-ride on high ability ones who have a lower cost of contributing. On the 
other hand, high ability players are willing to exert substantial amounts of effort that 
more than compensate for the free-riding since their cost (for additional contribu-
tions) does not increase rapidly. Hence, keeping the average group ability constant, 
the greater the heterogeneity within a group, the higher its effectiveness, or, equiva-
lently, a more spread out (unequal) distribution of abilities within a group increases 
its effectiveness. In hard contests, however, the cost of additional amounts of effort 
increases so rapidly that works as a deterrent for all players, but especially for the 
highly skilled that recede from exerting substantial contributions. So, when players 
are equally rewarded, a lower heterogeneity weakens this effect by making players 
exert similar (and less costly at the margin) efforts. Similarly, a less spread out dis-
tribution of abilities implies that members share the costs more equally, thus paying 
a lower cost per unit of group effort. A natural question to ask is whether the above 
result extends to our framework with optimal incentives where managers, assign-
ing specific incentives, can enlarge the range of the possible contributions of their 
members, which now depends both on abilities and prize shares. The study of this 
matter under the implementation of the optimal allocation 휙∗
i
 is straightforward for 
easy contests because the highest ability players always receive the entire prize. On 
the other hand, for hard contests, we have to carefully analyse players’ and manag-
ers’ behaviours. Indeed, any change in ability distribution leads to a change in the 
optimal allocation 휙∗
i
 , together with changes in the group effort X∗
i
 and aggregate 
effort X∗ . Thus, to make this analysis tractable we assume that g��(0) = 0 , which 
implies that all group members always receive a positive share of the prize, i.e. 
𝜙∗
ik
> 0 ∀vik > 0.15 Altogether, the equilibrium group i’s effort under the optimal 
prize allocation is
Since the prize allocation is a function of the distribution of abilities within the 
group, fixing 휎∗
i
 and X∗ allows us to write the group i’s effort as a function of the 
vector of abilities, X∗
i
= F(퐯퐢) . This observation and Definition 2 help us to state the 
next proposition.16
(7)X∗i =
ni∑
k=1
f
(
1 − 휎∗
i
X∗
vik휙
∗
ik
)
.
16 Condition on part (ii-iii) is similar to measures of cautiousness, i.e. (g���∕g��)∕(g��∕g�) . Similar ver-
sions of it appears prominently in the contest literature, for example see lemma 3 in Akerlof and Holden 
(2012) and Proposition 1 in Ryvkin (2011). However, g(x) is a deterministic cost function, hence these 
notions are not directly relevant to the situation under study.
15 The widely used power cost function x훼∕b satisfies this condition.
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Proposition 3.3 Given a contest between groups with managers: 
i) if the contest is easy, then an increase in within group heterogeneity raises the 
group effectiveness. Formally, a change from 퐯퐢 to 퐯′퐢 where 퐯′퐢 ≻ 퐯퐢 implies 휎′i ≥ 휎i , 
X′ ≥ X , and X′
i
≥ Xi;
ii) if the contest is hard, g��(0) = 0 and g��(x)∕g�(x) > 2g���(x)∕g��(x) , an increase in 
within group heterogeneity raises the group effectiveness. Formally, a change in 
the distribution of ability from 퐯퐢 to 퐯′퐢 where 퐯
′
퐢
≻ 퐯퐢 implies 𝜎′i > 𝜎i , X′ > X , and 
X′
i
> Xi;
iii) if the contest is hard, g��(0) = 0 and g��(x)∕g�(x) < 2g���(x)∕g��(x) , then a decrease 
in within group heterogeneity raises the group effectiveness. Formally, a change 
in the distribution of ability from 퐯퐢 to 퐯′퐢 where 퐯
′
퐢
≺ 퐯퐢 implies 𝜎′i > 𝜎i , X′ > X , 
and X′
i
> Xi;
Common to the literature of contests is the assumption that either groups imple-
ment the egalitarian allocation or group members are symmetric in their ability. 
Thus, the analysis of within group heterogeneity follows directly from Lemma 2. As 
a matter of fact, it is widely argued in the literature that in hard contests groups are 
more effective the less their within group heterogeneity. Examples include Nitzan 
and Ueda (2014), Cubel and Sanchez-Pages (2014), and Esteban and Ray (2001). 
However, as shown by part (ii), these results do not hold under the implementation 
of the optimal rule. For example, let the cost function be x훼 , and the related mar-
ginal costs g�(x) = 훼x(훼−1) . It is easy to see that a contest is hard for any 𝛼 > 2 , and 
g��(x)∕g�(x) > 2g���(x)∕g��(x) ∀𝛼 ∈ (2, 3) , which implies that for 2 < 𝛼 < 3 within 
group heterogeneity increases group efficiency under the use of the optimal alloca-
tion. Thus, the deterrent effect that induced highly skilled players to recede from 
exerting substantial contributions can be balanced out by assigning them higher 
shares of the prize.17 Indeed, if the initial share is the same, then an increment of 
the allocated prize induces more effort from the more able individual. Altogether, a 
more spread out distribution of abilities is efficient if the complementarity between 
ability and rewards boosts enough skilled players efforts to more than compensate 
for the deterrent effect of the increase in costs.18 We conclude our analysis highlight-
ing other relevant results related to the use of the optimal prize allocation. As shown 
in the following propositions, which follow directly from Proposition 3.3, we can 
rank groups’ probability of winning. Such a ranking is not possible in easy contests 
17 If g��(x)∕g�(x) > 2g���(x)∕g��(x) , then g�(x)∕g��(x) is increasing (see Eq.  (23)), which implies that 
higher ability players receive higher share of the prize. Interestingly, this is not generally true.
18 The same intuition can be explained looking at the marginal costs of contributing per unit of group 
effort via a simple example: a highly skilled player with ability V and a group of n symmetric players 
with ability V/n are competing for a prize P. The marginal cost of group effort are X훼−1
V
 and 
(
X
n
)훼−1
n2
V
 
respectively. Finally, it is easy to see that if 1 < 𝛼 < 3 the single player has lower costs and then he exerts 
higher effort in equilibrium.
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with heterogeneous groups under the implementation of other incentive mechanisms 
such as the relative effort rule and the egalitarian rule.
Proposition 3.4 Consider a contest with N groups formed by ni individuals such that 
퐯ퟏ ≻ ... ≻ 퐯퐍 . If the contest is easy and 휙i = 휙∗i ∀i , then groups’ probability of win-
ning can be ordered according to the highest ability members in every group. For-
mally, vi1 > ... > vN1 implies 𝜎1 > ... > 𝜎N;
Thus, if managers optimally allocate the prize, differences in sizes between 
groups are irrelevant to the group efficiency. Indeed, groups can be ranked according 
to the most skilled member in every group. In addition to this, for some specific hard 
contests, the ranking resulting from the egalitarian allocation can be fully reversed 
by implementing the optimal prize allocation.
Proposition 3.5 Consider a hard contest with N groups formed by ni = n individuals 
such that 퐯ퟏ ≻ ... ≻ 퐯퐍 . Let g��(0) = 0 , and g��(x)∕g�(x) > 2g���(x)∕g��(x) , then the use 
of the egalitarian allocation 휙i = 1∕n implies 𝜎1 < ... < 𝜎N , while the optimal allo-
cation 휙i = 휙∗i  implies 𝜎1 > ... > 𝜎N.
3.5  A full example with power cost functions
Let g(x) = x훼 , which for 𝛼 > 1 satisfies Assumption   1. Group i’s best response, 
when members are aware of the prize allocation 휙i = (휙i1,… ,휙ini ) implemented by 
their own manager, is given by
In order to maximize their group’s effort managers have to solve
From Proposition 3.2 we know that 𝜙∗
ik
> 0 ∀k if 훼 ∈ (2,∞) (hard contest), while 
휙i1 = 1 if 훼 ∈ (1, 2) (easy contest). Moreover, having assumed a specific cost func-
tion, the solution of (9) is
Finally, substituting (10) into (8) and rearranging, gives us the group i efforts in 
equilibrium of our model of contests with managers.
(8)X∗
i
(휙i) =
ni∑
k=1
x∗
ik
(휙i) =
ni∑
k=1
(
X∗
j≠i(휙
∗
j
)
X2
휙ikvik
) 1
훼−1
.
(9)휙∗i ∈ argmax X∗i (휙i) s.t.
ni∑
k=1
휙ik = 1, 휙ik ≥ 0 ∀k.
(10)휙∗ik =
v
1
훼−2
ik∑ni
k=1
v
1
훼−2
ik
.
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Proposition 3.6 Given a contest between groups in which the prize is optimally allo-
cated among group members: 
i) if 1 < 𝛼 < 3 , then the higher the heterogeneity in ability the higher the group 
effort.
ii) if 𝛼 > 3 , then the lower the heterogeneity in ability the higher the group effort.
ii) If 훼 → ∞ , then 휙ik → 1∕ni ∀i, k.
The above proposition shows that the category of contests for which heterogene-
ity increases group effectiveness is larger under the implementation of the optimal 
prize allocation than the egalitarian one. Specifically, it moves from 1 < 𝛼 < 2 , for 
the egalitarian allocation, to 1 < 𝛼 < 3 , for the optimal one. Finally, we can establish 
from Eq. (10) that the share of the prize that players receive depends on parameter 
훼 as follows: the higher the 훼 the more equal the prize division among group mem-
bers. It follows that, when the contest gets extremely hard, the optimal allocation 
tends to the egalitarian rule.
4  Conclusions
We have examined a model of group contests for a private good, in which individ-
ual contributions are not observable, to provide a prize allocation that maximizes 
groups’ effectiveness. Our main findings are the following: in easy contests it is 
optimal to allocate the entire prize to one of the most able group members; in hard 
contests the optimal allocation depends on players’ ability and their marginal pro-
ductivity of effort; we provide sufficient conditions that make, in contrast with other 
results in the literature, heterogeneous groups more effective than homogeneous 
groups even in contests with strictly convex marginal costs.
Our model is general in the sense that it can be applied to many types of con-
flicts and work environments which encourage competition through specific 
incentive schemes. Moreover, it does not require that managers observe the con-
tributions of every group member, a requirement that is necessary to implement 
the relative effort rule. Thus, we can advise managers on how to assign incen-
tives and build their teams in different situations. For instance, in competitions 
with symbolic rewards, such as “best store of the month”, we can advise manag-
ers to form a heterogeneous group to prevent free-riding problems when the cost 
function is not too steep. On the other hand, in retail firms that set up monetary 
(11)Xi =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
�
1−휎∗
i
훼X∗
vi1
� 1
훼−1
if 훼 ∈ (1, 2]�
1−휎∗
i
훼X∗
� 1
훼−1
(
∑ni
k=1
v
1
훼−2
ik
)
훼−2
훼−1 if 훼 ∈ (2,∞)
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reward contests for sales departments during periods with a positive shock or a 
peak in the demand for goods, such as the run-up to Christmas, we can suggest to 
the team managers to divide the prize among all group members to increase the 
team productivity assuming that the extra work provided by the workers substan-
tially increases their marginal costs. In addition, our analysis on within group het-
erogeneity reveals new insights on inequality in conflicts. Specifically, it shows 
that a more spread out distribution of ability increases group effectiveness for 
hard contests under the condition that groups implement the optimal prize alloca-
tion. The simplicity of our framework is attractive but might be criticized because 
the group managers do not exert effort and have one goal: to maximize their own 
team’s effectiveness. We could have assumed that team managers may contribute 
to their group’s effort, but it would not have changed our intuitions based on the 
contest’s categorization. Moreover, it is implicit in the model that managers max-
imize group efficiency because this gives them some direct or indirect benefits 
aligned with their teams’ results; for example, job promotions or other monetary 
awards.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1 The following proof is an extension of Ryvkin (2011) for a per-
fectly divisible prize. Player ik’s best response function has to satisfy
Note that the left-hand side of Eq.  (12) is the same for any player k of group 
i. Without loss of generality, let 𝜙i1 > 0 . It follows that for any xi1 we have 
(vim휙im)
−1g�(xim) = (vi1휙i1)
−1g�(xi1) . Thus, the effort exerted by all im, where m > 1 , 
can be uniquely determined as a share of the effort exerted by player i1 as
The group i’s effort Xi can be written as
(12)
Xj≠i
X2
= (vik휙ik)
−1g�(xik).
(13)xim = g�(−1)
(
vim휙im
vi1휙i1
g�(xi1)
)
.
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and using (13), the related marginal cost as
Functions 훼i(xi1) and G�i(xi1) are strictly increasing and satisfies 훼i(0) = 0 and 
G�
i
(0) = 0 . Therefore, the contests among groups reduces to a contest among N 
individuals:
Let Xi = 훼i(xi1) , xi1 = 훼−1(Xi) . Define Gi(Xi) = ∫
Xi
0
G�(훼−1(t))dt with initial condi-
tions Gi(Xi) = 0 . Gi(Xi) is strictly increasing, strictly convex and satisfies Assump-
tion 1. The group i’s expected payoff can be written as
The uniqueness of equilibrium follows from Theorem  3 of Cornes and Hartley 
(2005).   ◻
Proof of Proposition 3.1 Let g�(x) be strictly concave and f(x) strictly convex (easy 
contest). A profile of allocations (휙∗
1
,… ,휙∗
N
) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if it 
satisfies Eqs. (4) and (5) ∀i.
In order to prove the proposition we use the following observations: 
i) Equation  (4) holds with equality for any prize allocation, i.e. for any 
휙i = (휙i1,… ,휙ini ) there exists only one Xi (the opposite is not true);
ii) Equation  (4) is a sum of strictly convex functions for any fixed 
X = Xi + X
∗
j≠i(𝜙
∗
j
) > 0.19 Hence, it is strictly convex.
Let us define the group i’s effort that satisfies Eq.  (4) for a prize allocation 휙′
i
 as 
Xi(휙
�
i
, X∗
j
(휙∗
j
)) = X�
i
 (see observation i). Then, we can find an alternative allocation, 
휙a
i
 , which provides higher effort than 휙′
i
 , as follows: we fix the total effort at 
X = X�
i
+ X∗
j
(휙∗
j
) ; and we maximize the group i’s effort given by Eq. (4). Clearly, the 
solution of this maximization problem lies in a corner (see observation ii). There are 
𝛼i(xi1) = xi1 +
ni∑
m>1
g�(−1)
(
vim𝜙im
vi1𝜙i1
g�(xi1)
)
,
G�
i
(xi1) =
ni∑
k
g�(xik)
vik
.
(14)
1 − 휎i∑N
i=1
훼i(xi1)
= G�(xi1).
(15)
Xi
X
− Gi(Xi).
19 Assumption 1 guarantees that if 𝜙ik > 0 for at least a k in every group, then Xi > 0 ∀i.
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nh
i
 allocations, where nh
i
 is the number of players with the highest ability in group i. 
Under the allocation 휙a
i
 we have that
The first order condition is satisfied for Xa
i
> X′
i
 such that 
Xa
i
=
∑ni
k=1
f
�
X∗
j
(휙∗
j
)
(Xa
i
+X∗
j
(휙∗
j
))2
vik휙
a
i
�
. It is straightforward that every manager maximizes 
her group effort iff 휙i = 휙∗i  for any X∗j (𝜙∗j ) > 0 , i.e. she allocates the entire prize to 
one of the most able members. The uniqueness of equilibrium follows from 
Lemma 1.   ◻
Proof of Proposition 3.2 Let g�(x) be strictly convex and f(x) strictly concave (hard 
contest).
In order to prove the proposition we use the observation (i) and (ii) stated for the 
proof of Proposition 3.1. First, we define the group i’s effort that satisfies Eq. (4) for 
a particular prize allocation 휙′
i
 as Xi(휙�i , X∗j (휙∗j )) = X�i using observation (i). Second, 
using observation (ii), we find an alternative allocation, 휙a
i
 , which provides higher 
effort than 휙′
i
 as follows: we fix the total effort at X = X�
i
+ X∗
j
(휙∗
j
) ; and we maxi-
mize the group i’s effort given by Eq. (4). The solution of this maximization prob-
lem is interior, unique and implies
The first order condition is satisfied for Xa
i
> X′
i
 such that 
Xa
i
=
∑ni
k=1
f
�
X∗
j
(휙∗
j
)
(Xa
i
+X∗
j
(휙∗
j
))2
vik휙
a
i
�
. Overall, we have to find the allocation that maxi-
mizes (5) at X = Xi(휙∗i ) + X∗j (휙∗j ) , and the Xi(휙∗i ) that satisfies Eq. (4). The solution 
of Eq. (5) is given by
Let, without loss of generality, vi1 ≥ ... ≥ vini . From the system of Eq. (16) we have 
that
Using (17), the group i’s effort Xi(휙∗i ) can be written as
X�
i
<
ni∑
k=1
f
( X∗
j
(𝜙∗
j
)
(X�
i
+ X∗
j
(𝜙∗
j
))2
vik𝜙
a
ik
)
.
X�
i
<
ni∑
k=1
f
( X∗
j
(𝜙∗
j
)
(X�
i
+ X∗
j
(𝜙∗
j
))2
vik𝜙
a
ik
)
.
(16)
1−휎i
X
vik
g��(xik)
− 휆 = 0 ∀k.
(17)
vi1
g��(xi1)
≥
vim
g��(xim)
∀m > 1.
(18)𝜈i(xi1) = xi1 +
ni∑
m>1
max
[
0, g��−1
(vim
vi1
g��(xi1)
)]
,
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and the related marginal costs as
Functions 휈(xi1) and G�(xi1) are strictly increasing and satisfy 휈(0) = 0 , G�(0) = 0 . 
Therefore, the group contests reduces to a contests among N individuals:
Finally, let Xi = 휈i(xi1) , xi1 = 휈−1i (Xi) . Define Gi(Xi) = ∫
Xi
0
G�(휈−1
i
(t))dt with ini-
tial conditions Gi(Xi) = 0 . Gi(Xi) is strictly increasing, strictly convex and satisfies 
Assumption 1. Group i’s expected payoff can be written as
The uniqueness of equilibrium follows from Theorem  3 of Cornes and Hartley 
(2005). The equilibrium effort X∗
i
 implicitly defines the equilibrium allocation 
( 휙∗
1
,… ,휙∗
Ni
 ) through the relation X∗
i
= 휈i(x
∗
i1
) . To better see that this solution gives a 
unique prize allocation for all i consider the following contradiction. Suppose that 
the equilibrium effort X∗
i
 can be obtained by two prize allocations, 휙1
i
 and 휙2
i
 . This 
would imply that setting X∗ = X∗
i
+ X∗
j
(휙∗
j
) , and solving for Eq.  (5) gives the two 
solutions 휙1
i
 and 휙2
i
 . However, due to the strictly concavity of the best response func-
tion for fixed X the solution is interior and unique.
Part i)
Recall that X∗
i
(𝜙i) > 0 . Then, it is straightforward to see that the system of 
Eq. (17) holds with equality for all group members with the same ability vik iff they 
receive the same prize share 휙∗
ik
 . Note that this does not imply that these members 
receive a positive share of the prize.
Part ii)
Let g��(0) = 0 , then vik
g��(0)
= ∞ ∀k . The optimal prize allocation satisfies the sys-
tem of Eq. (17) with equality, i.e.
It follows that all ik receive a positive share of the prize 𝜙ik > 0 . In addition, we can 
rewrite (16) as
Finally, using ∑ni
k
휙ik = 1 , we can define the optimal prize allocation as
G�
i
(xi1) =
ni∑
ik
g�(xik)
vik
.
(19)
1 − 휎i∑N
i=1
휈i(xi1)
= G�
i
(xi1).
(20)
Xi
X
− Gi(Xi).
(21)
vi1
g��(xi1)
=
vim
g��(xim)
∀m > 1.
(22)
g�(xik)
g��(xik)휙ik
= 휆 ∀k.
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Part iii)
Let g��(0) > 0 . The prize allocation of all players can be derived from the relation 
𝜎∗
i
X∗ = X∗
i
= 𝜈i(xi1) = xi1 +
∑ni
m>1
max
�
0, g��−1
� vim
vi1
g��(xi1)
��
 . Moreover, if
then it holds
  ◻
Proof of Lemma 2 Given a distribution of ability 퐯퐢 = (vi1,… , vin) , the group i’s total 
effort given by (6) can be rewritten as
Equation (24) allows us to see that for each given X and 퐯퐢 there is a unique value 
of 휎i that satisfies Eq. (6). In other words, Eq. (6) implicitly defines 휎i as a function 
of 퐯퐢 and X; 휎i = 휎i(퐯퐢,X) . The equilibrium value of X is then determined by the 
condition ∑N
i=1
휎i = 1 . Moreover, 휎i(퐯퐢,X) is strictly decreasing and continuous in 
X, limX→∞휎i = 0 and limX→0휎i = 1 . These properties of the share functions follow 
directly from Theorem 3 of Cornes and Hartley (2005). Now, we are ready to prove 
the Lemma   examining the behaviour of 휎i(퐯퐢,X) moving from 퐯퐢 to 퐯′퐢 when f is 
strictly convex.
Let 휎∗
i
 and X∗ be equilibrium values under the ability vector 퐯퐢 , i.e. ∑N
i
휎∗
i
(퐯퐢,X
∗) = 1 , then:
i) fix X∗ and 휎∗
i
 , the right hand side of (24) defined by F(퐯퐢) is Schur-convex. 
Using Definition  2, a change in ability distribution such that 퐯′
퐢
≻ 퐯퐢 implies 
F(퐯퐢
�) > F(퐯퐢) . The 휎i that solves (24) for the new distribution of ability, but keeping 
X∗ fixed, is 𝜎�
i
(퐯퐢
�,X∗) > 𝜎∗
i
(퐯퐢,X
∗) . However, this is not the new equilibrium since 
𝜎�
i
(퐯퐢
�,X∗) +
∑N
j≠i 𝜎j(퐯퐣,X
∗) > 1;
ii) the new equilibrium total effort X∗∗ satisfies 휎i(퐯퐢�,X∗∗) +
∑N
j≠i 휎j(퐯퐣,X
∗∗) = 1 . 
Hence, X∗∗ > X∗ since 휎i(퐯퐢,X) is continuous and strictly decreasing in X ∀i . This 
proves that for every group other than i the winning probability strictly falls, i.e. 
𝜎∗∗
j
(퐯퐣, X
∗∗) < 𝜎∗
j
(퐯퐣, X
∗) ∀j ≠ i and 𝜎∗∗
i
(퐯퐢
�,X∗∗) > 𝜎∗
i
(퐯퐢,X
∗);
iii) finally, 𝜎∗∗
i
> 𝜎∗
i
 and X∗∗ > X∗ imply X∗∗
i
> X∗
i
.
The same analysis holds if 퐯′
퐢
≺ 퐯퐢 and f is strictly concave.   ◻
(23)휙ik =
g�(xik)
g��(xik)∑ni
ik
g�(xik)
g��(xik)
∀k.
vi1
g��(X∗
i
)
≥
vim
g��(0)
∀m > 1,
vi1
g��(f (
1−𝜎∗
i
X∗
vi1))
≥
vim
g��(0)
∀m > 1.
(24)
휎i =
∑ni
k=1
f
�
1−휎i
X
1
ni
vik
�
X
.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3 Part i)
Let vi1 be the highest ability in group i. In easy contests (f is convex) the opti-
mal allocation 휙i = 휙∗i  rewards players as follows: 휙i1 = 1 , 𝜙im = 0 ∀m > 1 . It 
follows from Lemma  2 that a change in ability distribution such that 퐯′
퐢
≻ 퐯퐢 and 
v�
i1
> vi1 → 𝜎
∗∗
i
> 𝜎∗
i
 . On the other hand, a change in ability distribution such that 
퐯′
퐢
≻ 퐯퐢 but v�i1 = vi1 → 휎∗∗i = 휎∗i .
Part ii-iii)
In order to prove Part ii (iii) of the proposition, it is sufficient to show that at a 
fixed X and 휎i the right-hand side of (7) is Schur-Convex (Schur-Concave). The rest 
of the proof follows from Lemma 2.
Let vi1 ≥ ... ≥ vini and from (7) F(퐯퐢) =
∑ni
k=1
f
�
1−휎∗
i
X∗
vik휙
∗
ik
(vik, 퐯퐢)
�
∕X∗ . Fixing X∗ 
and 휎∗
i
 , then F(퐯퐢) is Schur-Convex if it holds the Schur–Ostrowski criterion, 
𝜕F(퐯퐢)
𝜕vi1
−
𝜕F(퐯퐢)
𝜕vim
> 0 ∀m > 1 . Hence, if
Since g��(0) = 0 implies vi1
g��(xi1)
=
vim
g��(xim)
 (see the proof of Proposition  3.2 part ii) and 
∑ni
ik
휕휙ik
휕vim
= 0 , then ∑ni
ik
vik
휕휙∗
ik
휕vim
g��(xik)
= 0 . Overall, F(퐯퐢) is Schur-Convex if
Substituting 휙∗
ik
 with Eq. (23), we get
which holds when g��(x)∕g�(x) > 2g���(x)∕g��(x) ; thereby 퐯′
퐢
≻ 퐯퐢 implies 
F(퐯�
퐢
) > F(퐯퐢) and 𝜎�i (퐯퐢�,X∗) +
∑N
j>1
𝜎j(퐯퐣,X
∗) > 1 . Finally, part (ii–iii) of Lemma 2 
concludes the proof.   ◻
Proof of Proposition 3.6 In order to maximize Eq. (8) with respect to 휙ik , we have to 
solve the following Lagrangean problem:
which gives
We can rewrite the share of the prize for any player im ≠ i1 as a share of the prize 
received by player i1 as
𝜙∗
i1
g��(xi1)
−
𝜙∗
im
g��(xim)
+
ni∑
ik
vik
𝜕𝜙∗
ik
𝜕vi1
g��(xik)
−
ni∑
ik
vik
𝜕𝜙∗
ik
𝜕vim
g��(xik)
> 0.
𝜙∗
i1
g��(xi1)
>
𝜙∗
im
g��(xim)
(25)
g�(xi1)
g��(xi1)
2
>
g�(xim)
g��(xim)
2
L =
ni∑
k=1
(
1 − 휎∗
i
X∗
(vik휙ik)
) 1
훼−1
+ 휆(1 −
ni∑
k=1
휙ik),
f �
i1
(.)vi1 = f
�
im
(.)vim.
 F. Trevisan 
1 3
and substituting it in the constraint gives
A simple rearrangement defines the optimal prize allocation as
and for every im as
  ◻
References
Akerlof RJ, Holden RT (2012) The nature of tournaments. Econ Theory 51(2):289–313
Baik KH (1993) Effort levels in contests: the public-good prize case. Econ Lett 41(4):363–367
Baik KH (2008) Contests with group-specific public-good prizes. Soc Choice Welf 30(1):103–117
Bandiera O, Barankay I, Rasul I (2011) Field experiments with firms. J Econ Perspectives 25(3):63–82
Brookins P, Lightle JP, Ryvkin D (2015) Optimal sorting in group contests with complementarities. J Econ 
Behav Org 112:311–323
Cheikbossian G (2012) The collective action problem: within-group cooperation and between-group compe-
tition in a repeated rent-seeking game. Games Econ Behav 74(1):68–82
Corchón LC (2007) The theory of contests: a survey. Rev Econ Des 11(2):69–100
Cornes R, Hartley R (2005) Asymmetric contests with general technologies. Econ Theory 26(4):923–946
Cubel M, Sanchez-Pages S (2014) Inequality in conflicts. Technical report, Working Paper
Dasgupta P, Sen A, Starrett D (1973) Notes on the measurement of inequality. J Econ Theory 6(2):180–187
Esteban J, Ray D (2001) Collective action and the group size paradox. Am Political Sci Rev 95(3):663–672
Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1991) Perfect bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. J Econ Theory 
53(2):236–260
Hardy G, Littlewood J, Polya G (1934) Inequalities. Univ. Press, Cambridge
Marshall AW, Olkin I, Arnold BC (1979) Inequalities: theory of majorization and its applications, vol 143. 
Springer, Berlin
Nitzan S (1991a) Collective rent dissipation. Econ J 101(409):1522–1534
Nitzan S (1991b) Rent-seeking with non-identical sharing rules. Public Choice 71(1–2):43–50
Nitzan S, Ueda K (2011) Prize sharing in collective contests. Euro Econ Rev 55(5):678–687
Nitzan S, Ueda K (2014) Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests. Soc Choice Welf 43(1):219–238
Nitzan S, Ueda K (2018) Selective incentives and intragroup heterogeneity in collective contests. J Public 
Econ Theory 20(4):477–498
Olson M (1965) The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
휙im = 휙i1
(
vim
vi1
) 1
훼−2
,
휙i1 +
ni∑
m=2
휙i1
(
vim
vi1
) 1
훼−2
= 1.
휙i1 =
v
1
훼−2
i1∑ni
k=1
v
1
훼−2
ik
,
(26)휙∗im =
v
1
훼−2
im∑ni
k=1
v
1
훼−2
ik
.
1 3
Optimal prize allocations in group contests 
Ryvkin D (2011) The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups. Games Econ Behav 
73(2):564–572
Ryvkin D (2013) Heterogeneity of players and aggregate effort in contests. J Econ Manag Strategy 
22(4):728–743
Tullock G (1980) Efficient rent seeking. In: Buchanan JM, Tollison RD, Tullock G (eds) Toward a theory of 
the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, pp 97–122
Ueda K (2002) Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking. Soc Choice Welf 19(3):613–626
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps 
and institutional affiliations.
